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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE GRANTING OF OPTIONS BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN LIEU OF A NEW TRIAL
Where the jury returns a verdict in a case and the trial court deems
the damages awarded to be either inadequate or excessive, it is neces-
sary in order to preserve the constitutional right to a trial by jury that
the court award a new trial?
It is the purpose of this note to show how this problem has been
handled by the Wisconsin courts and by the Federal courts, and also
to point out the various alternatives to granting a new trial that have
been adopted and applied by the Wisconsin court.
The problem arises when the trial court is faced with a verdict
which in its opinion is either inadequate or excessive; should it grant
a new trial, which would necessarily mean additional expense to the
litigants and an additional burden on the court, or is there any other
means by which the rights of the litigants can be protected and justice
promoted?
The Wisconsin court has apparently reached its answer to this prob-
lem by using the "option" system, that is the court sets a sum which is
the lowest or the highest sum which an impartial jury properly in-
structed could award, and gives either the Plaintiff or the defendant
an option to accept the amount set or to submit to a new trial. The
first time the "option" plan came before the Wisconsin Supreme Court
appears to have been in the case of Nudd v. Wells'; where in an action
to recover damages for the non-delivery of a box of machinery the
jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff for $1,087. The defendant
moved to set this verdict aside as excessive, the trial court held the
verdict was excessive and ordered the plaintiff to remit the excess to
the defendant or it would grant the motion for new trial. On appeal to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court the court held, "If the excess was clearly
ascertainable and the proper amount of damages might be readily fixed
by the application of a settled rule of law to the evidence, perhaps the
practice adopted by the court below of allowing the Plaintiff to remit
the excess and then refusing a new trial, would be proper.... But we
are unable to see how such a practice can be sustained in such cases
(as this) without doing the very thing which they profess not to do;
that is allow the court to substitute its own verdict for a wrong verdict
of the jury, and on the Plaintiff's accepting that refusing a new trial."
Altho the "option" plan did not receive a warm welcome by the Wis-
consin court in its first appearance or in its second appearance 2 the
court soon began to recognize the practibility of such a plan and in the
1 Nudd v. Wells, 11 Wis. 407 (1860).
2Potter v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 22 Wis. 615 (1868).
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cases of Mauson v. Robinson;3 and Corcoran v. Harran4 the "option"
system was formally adopted by the court. The Mauson case was an
action in contract wherein the Plaintiff alleged the defendant was in-
debted to him in the sum of $350 with interest; the jury returned a
verdict for $692.12. The defendant moved to set the verdict aside
because excessive, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held, "The motion for a new trial, if denied
should have been denied only upon condition that the respondent enter
a remittitur of the excess." The Corcoran case carried the court one
step farther, that is to include tort cases within the "option" powers of
the trial court. This was a civil action for assault and battery, the jury's
verdict gave the Plaintiff $200, the defendant moved for a new trial
and the lower court allowed the Plaintiff to remit $100 of the verdict
and then denied motion for new trial. On appeal the Supreme Court
held, "In actions of tort as well as contract, where the damages are
clearly excessive, the trial judge may either grant a new trial absolutely
or give the plaintiff the option to remit the excess and in case he does
so order the verdict to stand for the residue. Clearly the practice will
tend to promote justice and lessen the expense to litigants and the
public." In commenting on the effect of such a practice on the defendant
the court said, "It is evident that the defendant has no complaint since
the reduction was a favor to him, 'certainly a party against whom a
judgment has been recovered cannot reverse it on the ground that it is
less than it should have been'." So by these two cases the foundation
was laid for the trial court to grant an option to the Plaintiff to remit
the excess of an excessive verdict or stand a new trial. However the
courts were still faced with the contention that such an option violated
the constitutional right to a trial by jury. This contention was first
answered by the court in rather broad general terms the court saying
that this practice didn't constitute an invasion of the province of the
jury but rather, "indicated that our jurisprudence is still developing
towards that ideal of perfection where the administration of the law
is truly the administration of justice." 5 It was in the case of Heimlich
v. Tabor6 that the court first stated the rule as to granting an option in
a case where the verdict is excessive as we know it today, and it was
in this case that the court gave the first logical answer to the conten-
tion that such options violated the right to a trial by jury. The court
said the rule concerning excessive verdicts allowed the court ". . . to
permit the Plaintiff to terminate the controversy without the expense
of a new trial by consenting to take judgment for an amount sufficiently
3 Mauson v. Robinson, 37 Wis. 339 (1875).
4 Corcoran v. Harran, 55 Wis. 120 (1882).
5 Baxter v. Chicago & North Western R. Co., 104 Wis. 307, 80 N.W. 644 (1899).
6 123 Wis. 565 (1905).
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under that named by the jury to cure such error in the judgment of
the court; and also to permit the defendant in such situations to termi-
nate the litigation whether plaintiff is willing or not, by consenting to
judgment for a sum sufficiently less than the verdict to, in the judg-
ment of the court cure the error." Thus we see that the court recog-
nized the possibility of not only giving the plaintiff an option to take
a lesser sum but also the possibility of giving the defendant an option
to take a lesser sum. The court went on to say that the requirement
concerning these options to be free from the charge of judicial invasion
of the right of jury trial is simply this, "Require the sum imposed upon
the defendant, whether he consents or not; giving the option to the
plaintiff, to be as small as an unprejudiced jury would probably name;
and the sum to be imposed upon the plaintiff whether he consents
or not, giving the option to the defendant, to be large as an unpreju-
diced jury on the evidence would probably name." The rule laid down
in the Heimlich case as to the sum which must be set by the court,
that is it must be the lowest amount which an unprejudiced jury would
award when the option is given the plaintiff; and the highest amount
which an unprejudiced jury would award when the option is given the
defendant, was followed by the Wisconsin court and is the law today.'
Although since the Heimlich case the power of the trial court to
grant options in case the verdict is excessive seemed firmly entrenched,
several other interesting questions have arisen concerning the use of
this power. One such question arose in the case of Urban v. Anderson8
where it was contended that the trial court was limited in its use of
options to cases where the excessiveness was due to prejudice, pas-
sion, ignorance or bias of the jury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held, "The court may deal with the matter whether the error is attribu-
table to perversity or the amount found by the jury is not supported by
the evidence in the case."
Another question arising under the use of options by the trial
court, which was faced with an excessive verdict, is the situation
where the trial court does not regard the verdict to be excessive but the
Supreme Court does. Must the Supreme Court order a new trial or
may it impose an option? The case of Secord v. John Schroeder L. Co.9
is an example of the Supreme Court imposing an option. Here the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff of $5,500 the Supreme Court
held, "We are inclined to hold in case of another trial a jury properly
instructed would probably not assess the damages at less than $4,000."
7Stangarone v. Jacobs, 188 Wis. 20 (1925); West v. Johnson, 202 Wis. 416(1930); Muska v. Apel, 203 Wis. 389 (1931); Malliet v. Super Products Co.,
218 Wis. 145 (1935) ; Urban v. Anderson, 234 Wis. 280 (1940).
8234 Wis. 280 (1940).
9 160 Wis. 1 (1915).
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The court then reversed and remanded the case with an option to the
plaintiff to take judgment for $4,000 and costs within twenty days after
filing of the remittur or have a new trial.
Thus in Wisconsin at least when the trial court has a verdict before
it which it deems excessive it may either grant a new trial; or it may
set the lowest sum which a properly instructed jury would award giv-
ing the plaintiff the option to accept that amount or have a new trial;
or it may set the highest sum which a properly instructed jury would
probably award, giving the option to the defendant.
We have seen that the Wisconsin court has recognized the principle
that the trial court may use this "option" plan in connection with exces-
sive verdicts, but what about verdicts where the damages awarded are
inadequate, may the court use a similar option plan in such cases? The
answer, at least in the Wisconsin court is yes.
Apparently the first time the court applied the "option" plan to
inadequate verdicts was in the case of West v. The Mil., Lake Shore
and Western Ry. Co.,10 where the lower court erroneously made the
direction not to allow interest in the judgment. The Supreme Court
reversed this holding saying, "The defendant is authorized at his option
within 30 days after filing the remittitur, to serve upon the opposite
party and file with the clerk a stipulation authorizing the Plaintiff to
take judgment for the amount of the verdict with interest thereon at
7% from the time of the rendition of said award to the entry of such
judgment, in which case the plaintiff will be entitled to judgment for
the amount of such verdict with interest." The court went on to say,
"Upon principle, we see no difference in allowing a party against itself
voluntarily to add to the verdict the amount so improperly excluded,
and then authorize judgment for the amount of such verdict and addi-
tur and the remission of part of an excessive verdict." The court then
remanded the case for a new trial subject to the option to the defendant
given above. This principle was affirmed in the case of Molzahn v.
Christensen," which was an action on a building contract, the trial court
found that the defendant's claim for unfinished work on the manure
pit was undetermined, having been omitted from the verdict and on
this account that the defendant was entitled to a new trial if he desired
one, and therefore, it gave the defendant the right to elect to have a
new trial on account of this error or submit to judgment against him
on the balance due the plaintiff according to the verdict. The defendant
elected to have judgment awarded against him for such amount. This
was affirmed on appeal.
10 56 Wis. 318 (1882).
11152 Wis. 520 (1913).
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The next problem which seems to have arisen in connection with
the court's use of options in connection with inadequate verdicts was
the contention that in case the trial court gave no option to allow judg-
ment for a sum fixed by the court or to accept a new trial that the
Supreme Court should do so. But in the case of Reuter v. Hickman,
Lauson & Diener Co.12 the Supreme Court held that these options were
a matter of discretion with the trial court, and the Supreme Court
would not interfere unless there had been an abuse of discretion. In
discussing just what sum should be fixed on by the trial court in case
it decides to use this method the court said, "In fixing such a sum the
maximum amount that in the judgment of the court any jury would
be warranted in assessing would have to be fixed on (if the option
given to defendent). If such option is given to the plaintiff the mini-
mum amount any jury would be likely to assess would be fixed on."
The Wisconsin court has been faced with the contention that these
options granted by the trial court in cases where the verdict is inade-
quate constitute a violation of trial by jury, just as they were in options
used where the verdict was excessive. The first real answer to such a
contention was made by the court in Campbell v .Sutliff.13 In discussing
these options the court said, "When the court grants the option to take
judgment for the sum which the court determines to be the least amount
which a jury could assess under the proof, the plaintiff cannot complain
that he has been deprived of his right to trial by jury because he cannot
question a judgment which has been entered because he elected to accept
judgment for that amount.... The defendant's constitutional rights are
not invaded because the judgment is reduced to the least amount which
the plaintiff may recover as determined by the court that has the power
to fix the minimum amount that may be recovered-the smallest verdict
which the court will permit to stand."
"Conversely neither party can complain when the defendant elects
to consent to the entry of judgment for the sum which the court deter-
mines to be the largest amount which a jury could assess under the
proof. The defendant cannot question the judgment because he has
elected to have it entered. The plaintiff cannot question it because it is
for the largest amount which the court will permit the jury to assess
under the proof of the case .... The right to a jury trial on the ques-
tion of damages can be waived like any other right guaranteed by the
constitution. It is waived by the party that elects to have judgment
entered in accordance with the option given him by the court. . ." To
the same effect is the court's holding in the case of Risch v. Lawhead'4
where the court said "Where in a case involving unliquidated damages,
12 160 Wis. 284 (1915).
13 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927).
14211 Wis. 270, 248 N.W. 127 (1933).
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the amount found by the jury is deemed by the court wholly inadequate
it seems clear that the trial court may grant a new trial unless the plain-
tiff consents to take judgment for such increased amount found by the
court to represent the least amount that an unprejudiced jury would
probably fix. Since the court finds the 'least amount' plaintiff must be
given an option to consent to the amount of damages found by the
court. In such a situation the defendant may not complain because the
court has only increased the damages to the least amount which it will
permit to stand in lieu of granting a new trial."
So the trial court may grant an option to the plaintiff or to the
defendant to accept a fixed amount or submit to a new trial in a case
where the court deems the damages awarded by the jury to be inade-
quate as well as a case where the damages awarded are excessive, and
this remains the law of Wisconsin today.'15
Therefore the Wisconsin court makes use of the option system
both in cases involving excessive verdicts and in cases involving inade-
quate verdicts. The question then is as to what variations of this option
system may be used. The options which may be used by the Wisconsin
courts can be divided into six classes:
1) In a case where the damages are inadequate the court may give an
option to the defendant to have judgment entered against him for the
maximum amount which a properly instructed jury could award, or to
submit to a new trial.
2) Also in a case where the damages are deemed inadequate the court
may give an option to the plaintiff to accept judgment for the minimum
amount which a jury properly instructed could award or to submit to
a new trial.
3) Or where the damages are inadequate the court may combine the
options number one and number two above; and first give the defendant
the option and then give the plaintiff an option and if neither elects
then the court will grant a new trial.
4) In case the damages awarded are excessive the court may give an
option to the plaintiff to accept the lowest amount which any reasonable
jury properly instructed could award, or to submit to a new trial.
5) In a case where the damages are excessive tfie court may also give
an option to the defendant to pay the maximum amount which a rea-
sonable jury, properly instructed could award, or to submit to a new
trial.
6) In a case where the damages are excessive the court can combine
the two options given in number four and five above and first give the
15 Tollander v. Bonneville, 3 N.W. (2d) 679 (Wis. 1942)
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plaintiff an option and then give the defendant an option and if neither
elects to accept the option then the court will grant a new trial.
The Federal courts do not seem to be in accord with the holdings
of the Wisconsin court in this matter of allowing the trial court to fix
options where the verdict is inadequate or excessive. Although the
United States Supreme Court started out on the same line of reasoning
as did the Wisconsin court they failed to go to the length of the
Wisconsin holdings. For example in the case of Northern Pac R. Co.
v. Herbert,1 where the jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of $25,-
000, the defendant made a motion for new trial because the damages
were excessive. The lower court ordered that a new trial be granted
unless plaintiff remitted $15,000 of the verdict and in case he did so
that the motion for new trial would be denied. The Supreme Court
held this was proper saying, "The exaction as a condition of refusing
a new trial, that the plaintiff should remit a portion of the amount
awarded by the verdict was a matter within the discretion of the court.
It held that the amount found was excessive but that no error had
been committed on the trial. In requiring the remission of what was
deemed excessive it did nothing more than require the reliquishment
of so much damages as in its opinion the jury had improperly awarded."
This decision was apparently followed without question for some
time17 and the Supreme Court had even declared that such an option did
not violate the right to trial by jury.' However with the case of Dimick
v. Schiedt9 the U. S. Supreme Court adopted the rule in regard to
these options in place of granting a new trial which stands as the federal
rule today. This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries
resulting from the alleged negligent operation of the defendant's auto-
mobile. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $500;
the plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground that the damages
awarded were inadequate. The trial court ordered a new trial unless
the defendant would consent to an increase of the damages to the sum
of $1,500. The defendant consented to this option and the motion for
new trial was denied. However on appeal to the Circuit Court of
Appeals this judgment was reversed on the ground that this conditional
order violated the 7th. amendment of the United States Constitution
in respect to the right of trial by jury. The Supreme court of the
United States affirmed the holding of Circuit Court of Appeals saying,
.. no federal court so far as we can discover has ever undertaken
16 116 U.S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, 29 L.Ed. 755 (1886).
17 Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1888) ; Kennon v. Gilmen, 131 U.S.
22, 29; Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41, 52; German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 312; Gila Valley S. & N. Ry. Co. v.
Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 103-5.
Is Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1888).
19 293 U.S. 474, 55 Sup. Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935).
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similarly to increase the damages although there are numerous cases
where motions for new trials have been made and granted on the
ground that the verdict was inadequate. .... When we consider the
great length of time mentioned, the federal courts were constantly
applying the rule in respect to the remission of excessive damages, the
circumstance that the practice here in question in respect of inadequate
damages was never followed, or, apparently its approval even sug-
gested, seems highly significance as indicating a lack of judicial belief
in the existence of the power." The court went on to say that in fact
if the question of granting such an option even in cases where the dam-
ages were excessive were originally before it it would not hesitate to
deny the existence of such a power in the trial court in such cases as
well as in cases where the verdict was inadequate. In commenting more
specifically on the use of such a power by the trial court and a denial
of the right to a trial by jury, the court in the Dimick case said: "When
therefore the trial court here found that the damages awarded by the
jury were so inadequate as to entitle plaintiff to a new trial, how can
it be held, with any semblance of'reason, that that court, with the con-
sent of the defendant only, may, by assessing in additional amount of
damages, bring the constitutional right of the plaintiff to a jury trial
to an end in respect of a matter of fact which no jury has ever passed
on either explicitly or by implication? To so hold is obviously to com-
pel the plaintiff to forego his constitutional right to the verdict of a
jury and accept an assessment partly made by a jury which has acted
improperly, and partly by a court which has no power to assess."
So the Federal rule seems to be, that the trial court can within its
discretion in lieu of unconditionally granting a new trial for excessive-
ness of damages, grant a new trial unless the plaintiff remits the exces-
sive portion of his damages. But the trial court does not have the power
to increase an inadequate verdict for the plaintiff, though the defendant
consents thereto, the only course open being to grant a new trial.
One more point should be mentioned in connection with the federal
holdings on this question, and that is, that apparently the rule in the
Dimick case is restricted to common law actions.20 In the case of
United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield Ass'n.,2 ' the Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the lower court was empowered to give the
defendant an option to consent to a verdict which had been raised be-
cause inadequate, or to submit to a new trial in a condemnation case.
The District court in the Kennesaw case in discussing the option said,
"Verdicts have often been set aside as excessive unless written down
to an amount fixed by the judge. I know of no precedent for refusing
20 United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield Ass'n., 99 Fed. (2d) 830
(C.C.A. 5th, 1938).2 1 Supra, note 20.
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one to be written up as a condition of refusing a new trial. I see no
difference in principle. In both cases the judge thinks the verdict wrong
in amount and will set it aside unless the party who desires to maintain
the verdict will voluntarily correct it rather than suffer a new trial."
The Circuit Court in discussing the District Court's opinion said,
".. . We agree with the District judge that Dimick v. Schiedt is not
controlling. We agree with the reason he gives that the complained of
action in requiring an additur and refusing a new trial was not taken
in a common law action within the 7th. amendment as it was in the
Dimick case, but in a condemnation proceeding to which the guarantees
of the 7th. amendment do not apply." Another Circuit Court of Appeals
case seems to strengthen the view that the restriction set up in the
Dimick case is confined to common law actions.2 2 The court saying,
"Under the 7th. amendment the national courts are without power to
add to a verdict in a common law action ......
It seems to the writer that the position taken by the Federal Court
in adopting the option system when the verdict in question is excessive
but refusing to adopt it in reference to verdicts where the amount
awarded is deemed inadequate, is not logical. In the writer's opinion
the position taken in the Kennesaw Mountain2 3 case and of the dissent
in the Diinick 4 case, that there is no distinction between granting an
option in a case, where the damages are excessive, and granting the
option in a case where the damages are inadequate, is the correct one.
The Wisconsin court seems to have had good success with this system
and their answer to the contention that any such option violates the
right to trial by jury seems a complete and logical one. Moreover, as
the Wisconsin court says, "Clearly the practice will tend to promote
justice and lessen the expense to litigants and the public. 25
ROBERT T. McGRAw.
22 Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Thomas, 123 Fed. (2d) 353 (C.C.A.
8th, 1941).23Supra, note 20.24Supra, note 19.
25 Corcoran v. Harran, 55 Wis. 120 (1882).
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